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EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Municipal solid waste (MSW) refers to a specific portion of the generated waste stream,
primarily solid waste generated by residential, commercial, institutional, and some industrial
sources. Traditionally, municipal solid waste management (MSWM) has been the responsibility
of local governments, with landfilling the most common method of disposal. In the early 1990's
federal regulations affecting traditional methods of solid waste disposal increased the cost by as
much as five- to ten-fold. In addition, the vast majority of states passed recycling laws, or
adopted recycling, diversion, or waste reduction goals, and many states approved comprehensive
waste management legislation requiring long-term planning (Steuteville, 1995). As MSWM has
grown increasingly complex and expensive, one strategy that some communities have developed
to meet new MSWM challenges is regional (e.g., multi-county, multi-community) cooperation
(Hickman, 1993 need reference). Cooperation is a process whereby neighboring cities, counties,
or other governmental entities pool resources to address local challenges, taking advantage of the
potential economies of scale associated with many aspects ofMSWM. Many states have also
included incentives, provisions, and/or mandates for formation of solid waste regions as an
element ofMSWM legislation.
Beyond the narrow arena of solid waste management, rural regions are faced with ever
tightening budgetary environments and must investigate alternative means to supply necessary or
mandated public goods. A common method is to exploit economies of scale by merging or
consolidating service regions for public goods. Following Gyimah-Brempong's (1987)
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pioneering empirical work on consolidation of law enforcement agencies, many researchers have
applied a translog cost function approach to evaluating scale efficiencies in the consolidation of
rural school districts (see, among many studies, the recent analysis of rural Arkansas school
districts by Dodson and Garrett, 2003). Other applications to provision of public goods in rural
regions include studies of county-level extension services by Garrett (2001) and rural roads by
Deller and Nelson (1991).1 Despite its obvious appeal, the cost function approach often presents
empirical difficulties in that one must have explicit measures for both inputs and outputs for
public goods. Inputs and outputs may not easily be quantified, however, and a quick review of
the literature will reveal some degree of anguish on the part of researchers with respect to this
issue (e.g., Garrett, p. 816). Even if one has reasonably good measures for inputs and outputs,
one must often assume away difficulties associated with jointness in production of outputs.
Further, it is not just scale economies that matter in the consolidation decision. A local
government may enjoy scale economies of a merger in the provision of a public good yet choose
not to take advantage of economies because the joint level of provision is not an optimum for the
entity. For example, Jacques et at. (2000) show that rural Oklahoma schools can achieve the
scale economies with larger school districts. The authors also show that student achievement
declines as districts get larger. Given this tradeoff, a community may rationally reject a costsaving merger if the jointly provided public good (student quality) is unsatisfactory.
Our empirical analysis concerns county-level cooperation decisions made in the aftermath
of the 1991 Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act. The theoretical approach follows Miceli's
(1993) model as developed to address public school district consolidation. Miceli's model
allowed for mergers only if both scale economies and the joint level of public goods provision
lRather than the "standard" cost function approach used by many, Deller and Nelson used a Farrell frontier
model to evaluate efficiencies associated with consolidation.
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represented a Pareto improvement for all. Similar to DeBoer (1995), we use the Miceli model to
evaluate consolidation of solid waste management districts, but our analysis differs from DeBoer
in that we use Poirer's (1980) partial observability approach for model estimation. This model
recognizes the decision to merge districts is a jointly determined outcome that is the result of
independent decisions of individual districts, an important factor not addressed in DeBoer's
study. The partial observability approach offers advantages over the cost function approach
because it is well-grounded in economic theory yet is far less data intensive.
We first review Miceli's theoretical model explaining the joint provision of a public
good, where the model is used to specify the factors important to an empirical test. The partial
observability model is then reviewed, followed by a presentation of the empirical results. We
then conclude with an agenda of future research.

Economies of Scale in a Model of Regional Cooperation

The argument that cooperation, or consolidation, in the provision of public goods was
explicitly expressed in Miceli's (1993) version of the Tiebout model. The model recognizes that
public goods, such as the provision of solid waste services, are funded out of property tax
revenues. Following Miceli's notation, a budget constraint for a member of county i can be
written as,
yi =

Xi

+ p(l + ti)hi

where Yi is income, Xi is a numeraire, p is the price of housing, ti is the property tax rate, and hi is
the quantity of housing. Given this income constraint, one can optimize utility and specify an
indirect utility function,
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where gj is the level of public goods provided by the local government. According to the Tiebout
hypothesis, members of a county will choose a residence so as to maximize this utility function
on the basis of the cost and provision of public goods. The county's tax base is given by,

with H j being the total housing stock in county i and Sj being the value of non-residential taxable
property in the county.
Assume that MSWM is the sole public good provided by the county. Let e(nJ denote the
unit cost function for providing MSWM to the nj residents of the county. As the derivative of the
unit cost function is negative or positive, marginal costs are decreasing or increasing. 2
Economies of scale exist if the marginal cost, de/dnj,is less than average unit cost, e(nJlnj.
Diseconomies occur if de/dnj > e(nJlnj. A balanced budget for the county is then given by,

Dividing both sides by nj and re-arranging yields,
e(ni)

--Xgi

ti = ---,-n:.. :. . i_ _

(1)

Bi/m

Equation (1) shows the supply of the public good in t-g space, where the slope of the supply
function is defined by the per capita unit cost of provision (in the numerator) and the per capita
tax base (denominator).
Assume now that a multi-county MSWM region is proposed. Such a regional
administration provides solid waste services gR which may differ from gj. Assume further that

2If del dn=O then there are no scale economies, and c(nj)=c( nj+ 1).
3If exogenous planning and operating funds for a MSWM district are given by OJ, total revenue available
for solid waste management is given by tjB j + OJ. Because planning funds were provided on only a one-time basis
they are ignored in this analysis.
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administrative costs are shared in proportion to county population. Total costs to county i are
now given by (n/n)[c(n)gR]' where n is the regional population. The balanced budget supply of
solid waste services under regionalization,

t/, is given by,
c(n)

--XgR

(2)

t ~ = _n'----__
I

Bil ni

The average unit cost of solid waste services, c(n)/n, will fall if there are unexploited economies
of scale associated with regionalization. If scale economies exist, the same level of solid waste
services may be provided at a lower cost, yielding a lower tax rate for the community.
Miceli also notes (p. 351) that two counties may be currently be providing different levels
of service, say gi and gj, and the jointly feasible level of provision, gR, may differ from the initial
amount offered by either community. Even if scale economies exist, each community must
decide if the change in the level of provision is worth the change in the community tax rate. This
suggests that, in addition to economies of scale measures, current levels and future levels of solid
waste services will be considered by entities. Finally, Brasington's (1999) study of school
district consolidation in Ohio notes that, given the relationships in (1) and (2), " ... communities
rich in property value will not be inclined to merge with property-poor communities unless they
are sufficiently compensated by cost savings" (p. 378).

Municipal Solid Waste Management in Tennessee

Tennessee passed a comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act in 1991. Passage of
this Act was the first effort by the state to require all counties to meet a minimum standard level
of service in the area of solid waste management. Elements of the legislation addressed solid
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waste planning, collection, disposal, recycling, education, and funding as well as collection and
disposal of problem wastes.
Specifically, the legislation required each county to form a solid waste region and to
develop a ten-year solid waste plan for the region. The legislation included a number of required
elements, including the requirement that at least 90% of all residents in the region have collection
service available to them. 4 The minimum collection service level was established to be a system
of drop-off convenience centers for garbage collection. Additionally, each county had to
establish a minimum of one collection center for recyclable materials. Grants were provided for
planning purposes, but not for ongoing operational costs.
Counties were permitted to form multi-county solid waste regions or a single-county
region. According to Section 12.a.2 of the Act, "The preferred organization of the regions shall
be multi-county. Any county adopting a resolution establishing a single-county region shall state
the reasons for acting alone in the resolution." No upper limits were placed on region size,
provided that all region members were contiguous counties.
Analysis conducted in 1991 by the University of Tennessee Waste Management Research
and Education Institute (Barkenbus, et al.) indicates that potential scale economies exist in
Tennessee (Figure 1). Savings are primarily due to declining average costs of landfilling in a
sub-title D-compliant landfill up to an efficient tonnage level. Economies of scale at landfills are
based on: 1) tonnage per day received at the facilities, 2) compaction rates achieved, as
measured by in-place refuse densities, 3) percentage of landfill volume taken up by dirt required
for various cover operations, and 4) average height of refuse over the liner (CTAS, 1991). The
cost savings available to larger facilities are due to the fact that more waste can be handled with
4 Another requirement was that all counties were to reduce the amount ofMSW entering landfills or
incinerators by 25% over a 4-year period.
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relatively small increases in equipment and labor, and there is an inverse relationship between the
tonnage received per day and percentage dirt required for cover. Further scale economies may be
captured at the collection stage as well as disposal.
ill response to the 1991 Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act, some 45 of

Tennessee's 95 counties joined multi-county solid waste regions in 1993. ill addition to the 50
one-county regions, one two-county, seven three-county, three four-county, and one ten-county
regions were formed (Figure 2). The decision each county made regarding the formation of a
solid waste region provides a natural experiment to test the Miceli model.

Methods and Data

Econometric Methods. The theoretical model suggests that the major factors affecting the
cooperation decision are per capita property values, population, current levels of service, future
levels of service, and differences in these measures. Unfortunately, we cannot directly measure
the "desire" of a county to join a region. This is because the observed outcome-joining a multicounty region or not-is the result of an agreement between two entities, not one. Thus, the
appropriate method of modeling the outcome is a "partial observability" model (Poirier, 1980).
Consider the desire by county 1 to join county 2 as measured by the latent variable Yl *,
and parameterized according to Yl * = !(Xl; (3), where the vector of explanatory variables Xl is
given by the theoretical model. The desire of county 2 to join county 1 is measured by the latent
variable Y2 * and parameterized by Y2 * = g(X2; (3). Following the standard random utility model
hypothesis, we observe county 1 desiring to join county 2, denoted as Yl
then the county does not wish to join and Yl =

o.

=

1, ifYl * >0. 5 IfYl * < 0,

Similarly, county 2 will desire to form a

5 The random utility model asserts that county one will desire to cooperate with county 2 if the utility of the
regional partnership exceeds the utility of the single county MSWM "region", or U\tt, gR) > Ul(t), gl) .
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regional partnership with county 1, denoted as Y2

=

1, ifY2 * >0, with Y2

=

°

otherwise. The

analyst does not observe either the latent variables y 1 * or Y2 *. Given the fact that both entities
must agree to form a partnership, Y 1 and Y2 are not observed either. Instead, what is observed is
the joint outcome, Z

=

YI x Y2. The observed joint outcome, Z, will take the value of one (an

agreement) if and only ifY 1 = Y2= 1. If either county chooses not to cooperate, Z

=

0. Poirier

terms this a partial observability model, which can be modeled as a bivariate probit with the
likelihood function,

where 4>2(·) is the bivariate normal distribution and p is the correlation between the two entities'
choices.
Data. County level data were available from a variety of sources. MSWM regional

status data were provided by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation,
Division of Solid Waste Assistance. The same department also provided information on the
current state of solid waste collection in each county, including the presences of landfills and the
percentage of unmanaged waste in a county. Population and population growth rates were
gathered from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, while property tax base data were found in the
Tennessee Statistical Abstract. Means for the single-county and multi-county regions are shown
in Table 1.
Following Brasington's data arrangement method, the 95 counties in Tennessee had 367
potential cooperative regional partnerships in the provision of solid waste services. 6 For any
given county, a potential partner may consist of one or more counties as long as the first county is

6 See Brasington's Appendix A, p.391. Prior to conducting any econometric analysis, Dr. Brasington was
gracious enough to review our data arrangement.
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contiguous with the potential partner. The data are arranged randomly in that assigning a
particular county or group of counties to "position" one or "position" two in the data set did not
intentionally follow any pattern. Further, given that potential partners may consist of more than
one county, we now refer to potential partners as "entities" or "units."
An entity's per capita assessed valuation measures the denominator in equation (2), while

the population of the entity proxies for average unit cost of solid waste services (the numerator).
Following Brasington, we anticipate that differences in assessed property valuation cause entities
to be less likely to form a solid waste region. The economies of scale hypothesis is supported
with a positive coefficient on the linear population term and a negative sign on the squared
population term. It is not clear that differences in population across entities would be positively
or negatively related to scale economies.
Current levels of solid waste services (gi) are measured in two ways. First, the presence
of a subtitle-D compliant landfill operated by the county or contractually available to the county
is measure of current services. Secondly, the Tennessee legislation mandates that 90% of a
region's residents must have access to some form of solid waste collection, a minimum level of
recycling opportunity and a la-year assurance of disposal capacity. In essence, the legislation
mandates a minimum level of gR. Some counties satisfied all of these requirements prior to the
legislation passage (gi

~gR)

whereas other counties did not satisfy any (gi < gR). We capture this

legislative influence with a variable measuring the percentage of unmanaged waste in a county at
the time the legislation was passed. Counties with higher percentages of unmanaged waste have
"further" to go to meet state-mandated service level requirements. It is hypothesized that the
more effort required on the part of a county to meet state-mandated requirements, the more likely
it be to join a multi-county solid waste region to achieve (gR). That is, the net marginal benefits

10
of cooperation are likely to be higher for counties with infant solid waste management programs
than those with well-developed programs. The difference in the percentage of unmanaged waste
represents a difference in the level of current service offered by each entity, gi-gj. It is
hypothesized that the greater the difference in current service levels reduces the likelihood of
cooperation.

Econometric Results

Two econometric specifications were tested (Table 2). The first specification focuses
only on those variables that capture the economies of scale hypothesis, current provision of solid
waste services, and a measure of the specific aspects of the legislation providing the impetus for
consolidation. In Model #1 of Table 2, the population related variables are statistically
insignificant, with P-values of 0.14 and 0.17, respectively, on the linear and squared population
terms. These results suggest that scale economies were not a major factor in the decision to form
a solid waste region. In contrast, the difference in per capita assessed valuation, is statistically
significant. This suggests that the greater the relative disparity in county wealth the less likely
the entities are to form a solid waste region. Availability of a subtitle-D landfill also makes the
entity less likely to form multi-county region. We interpret this result as finding that entities that
satisfy the one of the minimum legislative requirements (i.e., those for which gi

;;:::'gR

prior to the

legislation) are less likely to find formation of a multi-county solid waste region an improvement.
Finally, as the percentage of unmanaged waste in a county increases the greater the likelihood of
a regional partnership. This tendency is tempered by the negative effect of the difference on
unmanaged waste: partnerships are made between those with similar unmanaged waste problems.
This specification did an excellent job of predicting those counties that would join a multi-county
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solid waste region, but predicted rather poorly those that would not join a region (less than 4%
correctly predicted).
To improve the predictive capability of the model, we consider another potentially
important aspect of the legislation: the 10-year assurance of disposal. This suggests that a
measure of future growth in solid waste generation be reflected in the model. The second
specification reflects this aspect by adding the population growth rate to the model (Model #2).
In this case, scale economies associated with population are statistically significant if one
chooses a p-value of 0.11. Larger differences across entities in per capita assessed valuation
make cooperation in solid waste management less likely. The presence of a subtitle-D landfill
also reduces the probability of a cooperative arrangement. Increasing amounts of unmanaged
waste lead to cooperation but, again, only among those entities sharing similar level of
unmanaged waste. Finally, because those units with higher population growth rates will be
generating an ever greater quantity of solid waste; high growth rates reduce the probability that
an entity will join a multi-county solid waste region. This model maintain the excellent
prediction record of Model #1 for those choosing to join a region (over 95% correctly predicted),
while greatly improving the predictive record for those not choosing to join (over 21 % correctly
predicted).

Conclusions

The partial observability approach to modeling consolidation decisions has proved to be a
useful and relatively simple analytical method that may prove of interest to other researchers.
Similar to the cost function framework, the partial observability model can be well-grounded in
economic theory yet avoid many of the data complications of the former. The Miceli theoretical
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model of consolidation provides a clear set of testable hypotheses and can be readily
implemented in the empirical framework offered by the partial observability approach.
With respect to our empirical application, we find relatively weak support for economies
of scale in the formation of solid waste regions in Tennessee. While the coefficients indicate that
scale economies are likely to be present, the coefficients were only marginally significant.
Instead, the statistically strongest factors in the empirical model proved to be related to current
and future levels of solid waste services. Access to a subtitle D-compliant landfill and low levels
of unmanaged waste for an entity made that entity less likely to join a multi-county solid waste
region relative to those without access to a landfill and with high levels of unmanaged waste.
Further, those entities with high future growth in solid waste generation were less likely to join in
multi-county regions. Taken collectively, the statistical results highlight Miceli's point that the
existence of scale economies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a merger between two
entities. Indeed, our results suggest that the joint provision level and differences in current

individual provision levels are the driving forces in the decision of Tennessee counties to join a
multi-county solid waste region.
While the results presented in this paper are satisfying, the statistical models do not
include other important factors that are difficult to measure. For example, Tiller (1996) argues
that political risk and loss of local autonomy are important contributors to the cooperation
decision. Dinar and Wolf (1997) echo this argument, finding that political considerations are the
stabilizing influence in regional solutions that are economically feasible. Future research on
cooperative outcomes should endeavor to incorporate these factors into the analysis.
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Figure 1. Average cost per ton of landfill waste in Tennessee
(Source: Barkenbus et al.)
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Figure 2: Solid Waste Management Regions in Tennessee
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Table 1. Variable means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values
Standard
Deviation

Variable
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Population
45 "Join" Counties
36,021
45,306
5,920
285,536
.. . . . . . . . ?.9 . ~~~9.!.}S?..~!?:'.'.. . ~S?..~!?:!~.~.~. . . . . . . . . . ....... . . . ... . . .... ... ... . . . . ??.. ?...!. ?~. .. . . . . . . . . .!. ?~. '..?..!. ?.... ... . .... ... . . . . .... . . . . . 4..'. ?4..~. ... ..... . . . ... . ..... ... .~.?~.'..?..?...9_. _
Per Capita Assessed Value
45 "Join" Counties
4.89
11.06
6.68
1.49
50
"Not
Join"
Counties
16.76
7.35
2.66
4.43
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Subtitle-D Landfill
45 "Join" Counties
o
1
0.31
0.47
50 "Not Join" Counties
o
0.54
0.50
1
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................% of Waste Unmanaged
45 "Join" Counties
35.9
22.5
o
77.1
50
"Not
Join"
Counties
26.4
24.8
o
78.0
...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Population Growth Rate
2.73
8.27
45 "Join" Counties
-10.50
41.10
50 ''Not Join" Counties
-5.70
5.94
8.88
39.40
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Table 2. Partial Observability Models of Regional Cooperation
Variable

Model #1

Model #2

Intercept

Beta
-1.546

t-stat
-0.769

beta
-2.143

t-stat
-0.958

Population

0.071

1.491

0.090 b

1.687

Population Squared

-0.001

-1.357

-0.002

-1.625

Difference in
Population

0.008

0.457

0.009

0.502

Per Capita Assessed
Valuation

0.245

0.512

0.353

0.678

PC Assessed
Valuation Squared

-0.010

-0.303

-0.011

-0.321

Difference in PC
Assessed Valuation

-0.386 a

-2.474

-0.463 a

-2.889

Sub-D Landfill

-0.632 a

-2.312

-0.591 a

-2.135

0.019 a

2.004

0.019 a

2.028

-0.035 a

-4.452

-0.037 a

-4.58

Population Growth
Rate

-0.032 b

-1.706

Difference in
Population Growth
Rate

0.009

0.426

-0.344

-0.02

% of Waste

Unmanaged
Difference in % of
Waste Unmanaged

Rho
La g-Likelihood
Chi-Square
% Correct
% "Not Join" Correct
% "Join" Correct

-0.348

-0.021

-180.712
54.05 a
28.07%
3.65%
100.00%

asignificant at the 5% level, two-sided test.
bsignificant at the 10% level, two-sided test.

-176.893
61.691 a
40.05%
21.17%
95.70%
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EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
Kelly H. Tiller and Paul M. J akus

ABSTRACT

As traditional methods of municipal solid waste management (MSWM) become
increasingly expensive due to increased regulation, many local governments are considering
cooperation as a waste management strategy. A theoretical model is used to specify a partial
observability probability model in which the decision Tennessee counties made to form either a
single-county solid waste region or a multi-county region. We find that, while economies of
scale may be a factor in the consolidation decision, current and future levels of solid waste
services are statistically more important.

Key words: Regional cooperation; municipal solid waste; waste management, regionalization

EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Municipal solid waste (MSW) refers to a specific portion of the generated waste stream,
primarily solid waste generated by residential, commercial, institutional, and some industrial
sources. Traditionally, municipal solid waste management (MSWM) has been the responsibility
of local governments, with landfilling the most common method of disposal. In the early 1990's
federal regulations affecting traditional methods of solid waste disposal increased the cost by as
much as five- to ten-fold. In addition, the vast majority of states passed recycling laws, or
adopted recycling, diversion, or waste reduction goals, and many states approved comprehensive
waste management legislation requiring long-term planning (Steuteville, 1995). As MSWM has
grown increasingly complex and expensive, one strategy that some communities have developed
to meet new MSWM challenges is regional (e.g., multi-county, multi-community) cooperation
(Hickman, 1993 need reference). Cooperation is a process whereby neighboring cities, counties,
or other governmental entities pool resources to address local challenges, taking advantage of the
potential economies of scale associated with many aspects of MSWM. Many states have also
included incentives, provisions, and/or mandates for formation of solid waste regions as an
element ofMSWM legislation.
Beyond the narrow arena of solid waste management, rural regions are faced with ever
tightening budgetary environments and must investigate alternative means to supply necessary or
mandated public goods. A common method is to exploit economies of scale by merging or
consolidating service regions for public goods. Following Gyimah-Brempong's (1987)

2

pioneering empirical work on consolidation of law enforcement agencies, many researchers have
applied a translog cost function approach to evaluating scale efficiencies in the consolidation of
rural school districts (see, among many studies, the recent analysis of rural Arkansas school
districts by Dodson and Garrett, 2003). Other applications to provision of public goods in rural
regions include studies of county-level extension services by Garrett (2001) and rural roads by
Deller and Nelson (1991).1 Despite its obvious appeal, the cost function approach often presents
empirical difficulties in that one must have explicit measures for both inputs and outputs for
public goods. Inputs and outputs may not easily be quantified, however, and a quick review of
the literature will reveal some degree of anguish on the part of researchers with respect to this
issue (e.g., Garrett, p. 816). Even if one has reasonably good measures for inputs and outputs,
one must often assume away difficulties associated withjointness in production of outputs.
Further, it is not just scale economies that matter in the consolidation decision. A local
government may enjoy scale economies of a merger in the provision of a public good yet choose
not to take advantage of economies because the joint level of provision is not an optimum for the
entity. For example, Jacques et al. (2000) show that rural Oklahoma schools can achieve the
scale economies with larger school districts. The authors also show that student achievement
declines as districts get larger. Given this tradeoff, a community may rationally reject a costsaving merger if the jointly provided public good (student quality) is unsatisfactory.
Our empirical analysis concerns county-level cooperation decisions made in the aftermath
of the 1991 Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act. The theoretical approach follows Miceli's
(1993) model as developed to address public school district consolidation. Miceli's model
allowed for mergers only if both scale economies and the joint level of public goods provision
lRather than the "standard" cost function approach used by many, Deller and Nelson used a Farrell frontier
model to evaluate efficiencies associated with consolidation.
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represented a Pareto improvement for all. Similar to DeBoer (1995), we use the Miceli model to
evaluate consolidation of solid waste management districts, but our analysis differs from DeBoer
in that we use Poirer's (1980) partial observability approach for model estimation. This model
recognizes the decision to merge districts is a jointly determined outcome that is the result of
independent decisions of individual districts, an important factor not addressed in DeBoer's
study. The partial observability approach offers advantages over the cost function approach
because it is well-grounded in economic theory yet is far less data intensive.
We first review Miceli's theoretical model explaining the j oint provision of a public
good, where the model is used to specify the factors important to an empirical test. The partial
observability model is then reviewed, followed by a presentation of the empirical results. We
then conclude with an agenda of future research.

Economies of Scale in a Model of Regional Cooperation

The argument that cooperation, or consolidation, in the provision of public goods was
explicitly expressed in Miceli's (1993) version of the Tiebout model. The model recognizes that
public goods, such as the provision of solid waste services, are funded out of property tax
revenues. Following Miceli's notation, a budget constraint for a member of county i can be
written as,
yi = Xi + p(1 + ti)hi

where Yi is income, Xi is a numeraire, p is the price of housing, ti is the property tax rate, and hi is
the quantity of housing. Given this income constraint, one can optimize utility and specify an
indirect utility function,
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where gi is the level of public goods provided by the local government. According to the Tiebout
hypothesis, members of a county will choose a residence so as to maximize this utility function
on the basis of the cost and provision of public goods. The county's tax base is given by,

with Hi being the total housing stock in county i and Si being the value of non-residential taxable
property in the county.
Assume that MSWM is the sole public good provided by the county. Let c(nJ denote the
unit cost function for providing MSWM to the ni residents of the county. As the derivative of the
unit cost function is negative or positive, marginal costs are decreasing or increasing.2
Economies of scale exist if the marginal cost, dc/dni,is less than average unit cost, c(nJlni.
Diseconomies occur if dc/dni > c(nJlni. A balanced budget for the county is then given by,

tiBi = c(m)gi
Dividing both sides by ni and re-arranging yields,

c(ni)

--Xgi

ti=_n,-,-i_ _
Bilm

(1)

Equation (1) shows the supply of the public good in t-g space, where the slope of the supply
function is defined by the per capita unit cost of provision (in the numerator) and the per capita
tax base (denominator).
Assume now that a multi-county MSWM region is proposed. Such a regional
administration provides solid waste services gR which may differ from gi. Assume further that

2If dc/dn=O then there are no scale economies, and c(nj)=c(nj+ 1).
3If exogenous planning and operating funds for a MSWM district are given by Gj, total revenue available
for solid waste management is given by tjBj + G j. Because planning funds were provided on only a one-time basis
they are ignored in this analysis.
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administrative costs are shared in proportion to county population. Total costs to county i are
now given by (n/n)[c(n)gR]' where n is the regional population. The balanced budget supply of
solid waste services under regionalization,

t/, is given by,
c(n)

--XgR

(2)

t~
I

=_n_ __

Bdni

The average unit cost of solid waste services, c(n)/n, will fall if there are unexploited economies
of scale associated with regionalization. If scale economies exist, the same level of solid waste
services may be provided at a lower cost, yielding a lower tax rate for the community.
Miceli also notes (p. 351) that two counties may be currently be providing different levels
of service, say gi and gj, and the jointly feasible level of provision, gR, may differ from the initial
amount offered by either community. Even if scale economies exist, each community must
decide if the change in the level of provision is worth the change in the community tax rate. This
suggests that, in addition to economies of scale measures, current levels and future levels of solid
waste services will be considered by entities. Finally, Brasington's (1999) study of school
district consolidation in Ohio notes that, given the relationships in (1) and (2), " ... communities
rich in property value will not be inclined to merge with property-poor communities unless they
are sufficiently compensated by cost savings" (p. 378).

Municipal Solid Waste Management in Tennessee

Tennessee passed a comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act in 1991. Passage of
this Act was the first effort by the state to require all counties to meet a minimum standard level
of service in the area of solid waste management. Elements of the legislation addressed solid
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waste planning, collection, disposal, recycling, education, and funding as well as collection and
disposal of problem wastes.
Specifically, the legislation required each county to form a solid waste region and to
develop a ten-year solid waste plan for the region. The legislation included a number of required
elements, including the requirement that at least 90% of all residents in the region have collection
service available to them. 4 The minimum collection service level was established to be a system
of drop-off convenience centers for garbage collection. Additionally, each county had to
establish a minimum of one collection center for recyclable materials. Grants were provided for
planning purposes, but not for ongoing operational costs.
Counties were permitted to form multi-county solid waste regions or a single-county
region. According to Section 12.a.2 of the Act, "The preferred organization of the regions shall
be multi-county. Any county adopting a resolution establishing a single-county region shall state
the reasons for acting alone in the resolution." No upper limits were placed on region size,
provided that all region members were contiguous counties.
Analysis conducted in 1991 by the University of Tennessee Waste Management Research
and Education Institute (Barkenbus, et al.) indicates that potential scale economies exist in
Tennessee (Figure 1). Savings are primarily due to declining average costs of landfilling in a
sub-title D-compliant landfill up to an efficient tonnage level. Economies of scale at landfills are
based on: 1) tonnage per day received at the facilities, 2) compaction rates achieved, as
measured by in-place refuse densities, 3) percentage of landfill volume taken up by dirt required
for various cover operations, and 4) average height of refuse over the liner (CTAS, 1991). The
cost savings available to larger facilities are due to the fact that more waste can be handled with
4Another requirement was that all counties were to reduce the amount ofMSW entering landfills or
incinerators by 25% over a 4-year period.
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relatively small increases in equipment and labor, and there is an inverse relationship between the
tonnage received per day and percentage dirt required for cover. Further scale economies may be
captured at the collection stage as well as disposal.
In response to the 1991 Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act, some 45 of

Tennessee's 95 counties joined multi-county solid waste regions in 1993. In addition to the 50
one-county regions, one two-county, seven three-county, three four-county, and one ten-county
regions were formed (Figure 2). The decision each county made regarding the formation of a
solid waste region provides a natural experiment to test the Miceli model.

Methods and Data

Econometric Methods. The theoretical model suggests that the major factors affecting the

cooperation decision are per capita property values, population, current levels of service, future
levels of service, and differences in these measures. Unfortunately, we cannot directly measure
the "desire" of a county to join a region. This is because the observed outcome-joining a multicounty region or not-is the result of an agreement between two entities, not one. Thus, the
appropriate method of modeling the outcome is a "partial observability" model (Poirier, 1980).
Consider the desire by county 1 to join county 2 as measured by the latent variable YI *,
and parameterized according to YI * = !(XI; (3), where the vector of explanatory variables Xl is
given by the theoretical model. The desire of county 2 to join county 1 is measured by the latent
variable Y2 * and parameterized by Y2 * = g(X2; (3). Following the standard random utility model
hypothesis, we observe county 1 desiring to join county 2, denoted as YI
then the county does not wish to join andYI =

=

1, ifYI * >0. 5 IfYI * < 0,

o. Similarly, county 2 will desire to form a

5 The random utility model asserts that county one will desire to cooperate with county 2 if the utility of the
regional partnership exceeds the utility of the single county MSWM "region", or U\tt, gR) > UI(tb gl) .
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regional partnership with county 1, denoted as Y2

=

1, ifY2 * >0, with Y2

=

°

otherwise. The

analyst does not observe either the latent variables YI * or Y2 *. Given the fact that both entities
must agree to form a partnership, YI and Y2 are not observed either. Instead, what is observed is
the joint outcome, Z

=

YI x Y2. The observed joint outcome, z, will take the value of one (an

agreement) if and only ifYI= Y2=i. If either county chooses not to cooperate, Z

=

0. Poirier

terms this a partial observability model, which can be modeled as a bivariate probit with the
likelihood function,

where 4>2(-) is the bivariate normal distribution and p is the correlation between the two entities'
choices.

Data. County level data were available from a variety of sources. MSWM regional
status data were provided by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation,
Division of Solid Waste Assistance. The same department also provided information on the
current state of solid waste collection in each county, including the presences of landfills and the
percentage of unmanaged waste in a county. Population and population growth rates were
gathered from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, while property tax base data were found in the
Tennessee Statistical Abstract. Means for the single-county and multi-county regions are shown
in Table 1.
Following Brasington's data arrangement method, the 95 counties in Tennessee had 367
potential cooperative regional partnerships in the provision of solid waste services. 6 For any
given county, a potential partner may consist of one or more counties as long as the first county is

6 See Brasington's Appendix A, p.391. Prior to conducting any econometric analysis, Dr. Brasington was
gracious enough to review our data arrangement.
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contiguous with the potential partner. The data are arranged randomly in that assigning a
particular county or group of counties to "position" one or "position" two in the data set did not
intentionally follow any pattern. Further, given that potential partners may consist of more than
one county, we now refer to potential partners as "entities" or "units."
An entity's per capita assessed valuation measures the denominator in equation (2), while

the population of the entity proxies for average unit cost of solid waste services (the numerator).
Following Brasington, we anticipate that differences in assessed property valuation cause entities
to be less likely to form a solid waste region. The economies of scale hypothesis is supported
with a positive coefficient on the linear population term and a negative sign on the squared
population term. It is not clear that differences in population across entities would be positively
or negatively related to scale economies.
Current levels of solid waste services (gi) are measured in two ways. First, the presence
of a subtitle-D compliant landfill operated by the county or contractually available to the county
is measure of current services. Secondly, the Tennessee legislation mandates that 90% of a
region's residents must have access to some form of solid waste collection, a minimum level of
recycling opportunity and a la-year assurance of disposal capacity. In essence, the legislation
mandates a minimum level of gR. Some counties satisfied all of these requirements prior to the
legislation passage (gi

~R)

whereas other counties did not satisfy any (gi < gR). We capture this

legislative influence with a variable measuring the percentage of unmanaged waste in a county at
the time the legislation was passed. Counties with higher percentages of unmanaged waste have
"further" to go to meet state-mandated service level requirements. It is hypothesized that the
more effort required on the part of a county to meet state-mandated requirements, the more likely
it be to join a multi-county solid waste region to achieve (gR). That is, the net marginal benefits
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of cooperation are likely to be higher for counties with infant solid waste management programs
than those with well-developed programs. The difference in the percentage of unmanaged waste
represents a difference in the level of current service offered by each entity, g i-gj. It is
hypothesized that the greater the difference in current service levels reduces the likelihood of
cooperation.

Econometric Results

Two econometric specifications were tested (Table 2). The first specification focuses
only on those variables that capture the economies of scale hypothesis, current provision of solid
waste services, and a measure of the specific aspects of the legislation providing the impetus for
consolidation. In Model #1 of Table 2, the population related variables are statistically
insignificant, with P-values of 0.14 and 0.17, respectively, on the linear and squared population
tenns. These results suggest that scale economies were not a major factor in the decision to fonn
a solid waste region. In contrast, the difference in per capita assessed valuation, is statistically
significant. This suggests that the greater the relative disparity in county wealth the less likely
the entities are to fonn a solid waste region. Availability of a subtitle-D landfill also makes the
entity less likely to fonn multi-county region. We interpret this result as finding that entities that
satisfy the one of the minimum legislative requirements (i.e., those for which gi

~R

prior to the

legislation) are less likely to find fonnation of a multi-county solid waste region an improvement.
Finally, as the percentage of unmanaged waste in a county increases the greater the likelihood of
a regional partnership. This tendency is tempered by the negative effect of the difference on
unmanaged waste: partnerships are made between those with similar unmanaged waste problems.
This specification did an excellent job of predicting those counties that would join a multi-county
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solid waste region, but predicted rather poorly those that would not join a region (less than 4%
correctly predicted).
To improve the predictive capability of the model, we consider another potentially
important aspect of the legislation: the 1a-year assurance of disposal. This suggests that a
measure of future growth in solid waste generation be reflected in the model. The second
specification reflects this aspect by adding the population growth rate to the model (Model #2).
In this case, scale economies associated with population are statistically significant if one
chooses a p-value of 0.11. Larger differences across entities in per capita assessed valuation
make cooperation in solid waste management less likely. The presence of a subtitle-D landfill
also reduces the probability of a cooperative arrangement. Increasing amounts of unmanaged
waste lead to cooperation but, again, only among those entities sharing similar level of
unmanaged waste. Finally, because those units with higher population growth rates will be
generating an ever greater quantity of solid waste; high growth rates reduce the probability that
an entity will join a multi-county solid waste region. This model maintain the excellent
prediction record of Model #1 for those choosing to join a region (over 95% correctly predicted),
while greatly improving the predictive record for those not choosing to join (over 21 % correctly
predicted).

Conclusions

The partial observability approach to modeling consolidation decisions has proved to be a
useful and relatively simple analytical method that may prove of interest to other researchers.
Similar to the cost function framework, the partial observability model can be well-grounded in
economic theory yet avoid many of the data complications of the former. The Miceli theoretical
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model of consolidation provides a clear set of testable hypotheses and can be readily
implemented in the empirical framework offered by the partial observability approach.
With respect to our empirical application, we fmd relatively weak support for economies
of scale in the formation of solid waste regions in Tennessee. While the coefficients indicate that
scale economies are likely to be present, the coefficients were only marginally significant.
Instead, the statistically strongest factors in the empirical model proved to be related to current
and future levels of solid waste services. Access to a subtitle D-compliant landfill and low levels
of unmanaged waste for an entity made that entity less likely to join a multi-county solid waste
region relative to those without access to a landfill and with high levels of unmanaged waste.
Further, those entities with high future growth in solid waste generation were less likely to join in
multi-county regions. Taken collectively, the statistical results highlight Miceli's point that the
existence of scale economies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a merger between two
entities. Indeed, our results suggest that the joint provision level and differences in current

individual provision levels are the driving forces in the decision of Tennessee counties to join a
multi-county solid waste region.
While the results presented in this paper are satisfying, the statistical models do not
include other important factors that are difficult to measure. For example, Tiller (1996) argues
that political risk and loss of local autonomy are important contributors to the cooperation
decision. Dinar and Wolf (1997) echo this argument, finding that political considerations are the
stabilizing influence in regional solutions that are economically feasible. Future research on
cooperative outcomes should endeavor to incorporate these factors into the analysis.
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Figure 1. Average cost per ton of landfill waste in Tennessee
(Source: Barkenbus et al.)
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Figure 2: Solid Waste Management Regions in Tennessee
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Table 1. Variable means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values

Variable
Population
45 "Join" Counties
50 "Not Join" Counties
.................................................................................................................................................................................... ...........
Per Capita Assessed Value
45 "Join" Counties
50 "Not Join" Counties
.................................................................................................................................
Subtitle-D Landfill
45 "Join" Counties
50 "Not Join" Counties
% of Waste Unmanaged
45 "Join" Counties
50 "Not Join" Counties
Population Growth Rate
45 "Join" Counties
50 "Not Join" Counties
-

Mean

36,021
. ~.?'..!. ?..?.

Standard
Deviation

45,306
13 8.'..?. !. ~.. . . . .

Minimum

Maximum

5,920
285,536
.. ... . .. .... . . . . . . .:!.'.?.:!.~ . . . ..... ..... . . . . . . . .~.~.~.'..~.~.9.. . _

6.68
7.35

1.49
2.66

4.89
4.43

11.06
16.76

0.31
0.54

0.47
0.50

o
o

1

o
22.5
35.9
o
24.8
26.4
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................
2.73
5.94

8.27
8.88

-10.50
-5.70

1

77.1
78.0
41.10
39.40
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Table 2. Partial Observability Models of Regional Cooperation
Variable

Model #1

Model #2

Intercept

Beta
-1.546

t-stat
-0.769

beta
-2.143

t-stat
-0.958

Population

0.071

1.491

0.090 b

1.687

Population Squared

-0.001

-1.357

-0.002

-1.625

Difference in
Population

0.008

0.457

0.009

0.502

Per Capita Assessed
Valuation

0.245

0.512

0.353

0.678

PC Assessed
Valuation Squared

-0.010

-0.303

-0.011

-0.321

Difference in PC
Assessed Valuation

-0.386 a

-2.474

-0.463 a

-2.889

Sub-D Landfill

-0.632 a

-2.312

-0.591 a

-2.135

% of Waste
Unmanaged

0.019 a

2.004

0.019 a

2.028

Difference in % of
Waste Unmanaged

-0.035 a

-4.452

-0.037a

-4.58

Population Growth
Rate

-0.032 b

-1.706

Difference in
Population Growth
Rate

0.009

0.426

-0.344

-0.02

Rho
Log-Likelihood
Chi-Square
% Correct
% "Not Join" Correct
% "Join" Correct

-0.348

-0.021

-180.712
54.05 a
28.07%
3.65%
100.00%

asignificant at the 5% level, two-sided test.
bsignificant at the 10% level, two-sided test.

-176.893
61.691 a
40.05%
21.17%
95.70%
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